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Abstract: Like David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue
that the facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the
rationality of basic exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology.
I will show that their argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of
religious pluralism make it necessary for the religious exclusivist to support her
exclusive beliefs with signiﬁcant reasons is one that the reformed epistemologist has
the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to demonstrate that it is impossible for
basic religious beliefs to return to their properly basic state after defeaters against
them have been defeated. Finally, I consider whether there is perhaps a similar but
better argument in the neighbourhood and conclude in the negative. Reformed
Epistemology’s defence of exclusivism thus remains undefeated.
Introduction
A religious exclusivist maintains that her own religion is superior to other
religions in the sense of it being the only true religion.1 According to Reformed
Epistemology (RE), an exclusivist’s religious beliefs can be rational or warranted
in the manner of properly basic beliefs, i.e., without being based on reasons or
arguments. Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune (2008) criticize this claim and argue
that an exclusivist who has become (fully) aware of the facts of religious pluralism
can no longer be rational in holding her religious beliefs in the basic way.2 The
facts of pluralism give her a defeater that can only be defeated by acquiring and
retaining ‘epistemically signiﬁcant reasons’ to support her religious beliefs.
I will argue that Baldwin and Thune’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the
champion of RE need not concede the necessity of epistemically signiﬁcant
reasons to defeat the defeater that pluralism gives her. Secondly, even if she were
to concede that reasons are necessary, it remains possible – in spite of Baldwin
and Thune’s claim to the contrary – that these reasons can be discarded once the
defeater of pluralism has been defeated so that the exclusivist’s religious beliefs
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return to their former proper basicality. After that, I will consider whether there is
perhaps a better argument against exclusivism in the vicinity, but conclude in the
negative.
Baldwin and Thune on religious pluralism and defeat
Full awareness of religious pluralism provides an exclusivist with trust-
worthy testimony, the content of which conﬂicts with her own religious beliefs.
Testimony is a source of basic beliefs.3 So, upon appreciating the facts of plural-
ism, the exclusivist acquires basic beliefs that conﬂict with her own basic re-
ligious beliefs. Since, for all the exclusivist can tell, there is complete internal
epistemic parity between her and adherents of other (incompatible) religions,
these conﬂicting beliefs will act as a defeater for her own religious beliefs.
Moreover, pluralism also acts as a defeater for any belief of hers to the eﬀect that
she has access to a special source of religious knowledge such as a sensus divi-
nitatis or the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS), as in Alvin Plantinga’s
(2000) extended Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model for warranted Christian belief. In
other words, the exclusivist cannot simply appeal to her having such access in
order to defeat the defeater that pluralism gives her. That is because adherents of
other religions might make analogous appeals to such special sources of religious
knowledge and testify that these sources produce in them their speciﬁc religious
beliefs, which are incompatible with those of the exclusivist. This calls into
question the reliability of the exclusivist’s special source of religious knowledge.
In order for the exclusivist’s religious beliefs to become rational again,4 say
Baldwin and Thune, she needs ‘epistemically signiﬁcant reasons’ (2008, 451),
i.e. ‘at a minimum, some argumentation, evidence, or inference to other beliefs’
(ibid., 453), which will either support her own beliefs directly or indirectly, by
giving her reasons to discount incompatible religious beliefs. In other words:
Necessity of Reasons (NR) Rationality requires that the religious
exclusivist who is fully aware of the facts of religious pluralism have
epistemically signiﬁcant reasons to support her religious beliefs.
By acquiring support from such reasons, however, the exclusivist’s religious
beliefs cease to be basic. Hence, Baldwin and Thune’s conclusion: those who are
aware of pluralism cannot hold their religious beliefs rationally in the manner of
properly basic beliefs.
But there is one possible escape to this line of reasoning, as Baldwin and Thune
rightly point out. Perhaps epistemically signiﬁcant reasons are needed only to
discard the defeater but can be disposed of once that has been accomplished.
Imagine that you look at a table in normal daylight and form the belief that it is
red. Then your friend John comes along and tells you that the table is really white
but is currently illuminated by red light. This gives you a defeater for your original
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belief. Five minutes later, however, John tells you that he was only joking. This
defeats your defeater. You can forget about John’s earlier testimony and your
original belief goes back to being a properly basic perceptual belief again.
(See Plantinga (1993), 185, for a structurally similar case.) If something
analogous is possible for religious belief that threatens to be defeated by plural-
ism, the exclusivist’s belief could return to its original state of proper basicality
after all.
To block this escape, Baldwin and Thune (2008, 453) distinguish between
Drain-O and table-leg defeater-defeaters. A Drain-O defeater eﬀectively ﬂushes
itself out along with the defeater it defeats, so that the original belief can remain
rational in exactly the way it was. It adds nothing to the original support for your
belief, but only serves to discard the defeater. The red-table case above is an
example. In contrast, a table-leg defeater-defeater must be retained for the orig-
inal belief to remain rational because it defeats a defeater by supplementing or
even replacing the support for the original belief. Suppose your friend Bob tells
you that Alice was at the party. You then learn that Bob had a few drinks too many
and can’t remember clearly who was and who was not present at the party. This
gives you a defeater for your belief that Alice was at the party. The next day you
run into Alice, who conﬁrms that she was at the party. This defeats your defeater
and at the same time supplements (or replaces) the support for your belief that
Alice was at the party. In order for your belief to remain rational, you must retain
this defeater-defeater. Baldwin and Thune boldly assert that the epistemically
signiﬁcant reasons required to defeat the defeater presented by pluralism will
always be table legs (2008, 453). Hence:
Retainment of Reasons (RR) The epistemically signiﬁcant reasons
referred to in NR are always such that they must be retained in order for
an exclusivist’s religious beliefs to remain rational.
In the next section, I will show that the reformed epistemologist need not
accept NR. In the section after that, I will argue that even if NR is accepted, RR
can still be denied as its only plausible defence leads to fairly widespread and
unattractive scepticism.
Are reasons necessary?
The fundamentally sound intuition behind NR is that defeater-defeat
requires something extra beyond the initial belief and its support. You cannot
defeat a defeater for a belief by means of that very belief itself or the support you
already have for it. Attempting to defend a belief merely by, as it were, stamping
one’s feet and holding on to it falls short of what rationality requires.
Baldwin and Thune immediately go on to limit the admissible kinds of
additional support to just one, namely reasons. For someone who sympathizes
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with RE, that is a crucial mistake. For why could additional support not come
from something other than reasons, such as perception, memory, or further
testimony? This happens in many everyday cases of defeater-defeat. Recall the
red-table case from above, but now suppose that John hadn’t told you he was
joking. Could you not have defeated your defeater by further perception, i.e. by
taking a closer look at the table, perhaps checking for the presence of nearby red
lamps?
Or take a case of memory belief. You remember having eaten a grapefruit for
breakfast yesterday, when your partner tells you that she is convinced that it was
an orange. You consult your memory again and vividly remember the look, smell,
and taste of yesterday’s grapefruit. By doing so, you defeat the defeater you ac-
quired through your partner’s testimony. For the case of religious belief this
would mean – in terms of Plantinga’s extended A/C model – that a renewed and
more powerful working of your sensus divinitatis and/or a more powerful IIHS
could serve to defeat the defeater you acquired through becoming aware of the
facts of religious pluralism.
Indeed, this is exactly what Plantinga himself seems to have in mind. Consider
ﬁrst the following passage, also quoted by Baldwin and Thune:
Perhaps you have always believed it deeply wrong for a counselor to use his position
of trust to seduce a client. Perhaps you discover that others disagree; they think it
more like a minor peccadillo, like running a red light when there’s no traﬃc; and you
realize that possibly these people have the same internal markers for their beliefs that
you have for yours. You think the matter over more fully, imaginatively re-create and
rehearse such situations, become more aware of just what is involved in such a situation
(the breach of trust, the injustice and unfairness, the nasty irony of a situation in
which someone comes to a counselor seeking help but receives only hurt), and come
to believe even more ﬁrmly that such an action is wrong. (Plantinga (2000), 457)
Baldwin and Thune interpret this passage as aﬃrming NR. Thinking the matter
over more fully, they believe, gives you reasons to support your belief that it
is wrong for a counsellor to use his position of trust to seduce a client. These
reasons then form an indispensable supplement to the support your moral belief
had before from, presumably, moral intuition. Without them, your contested
moral belief could not be held rationally any more.
In view of Plantinga’s insistence on the possibility of rational basic religious
belief, even for intellectually sophisticated exclusivists who are well aware of
pluralism, such an interpretation is markedly uncongenial, if not plain wrong.
So instead of interpreting this passage as aﬃrming NR, we would do better to
interpret it along the lines of my earlier suggestion. The idea would then be that
your thinking carefully about the situation occasions a renewed and more
powerful working of your moral intuition, which defeats the defeater you ac-
quired upon learning that others disagree. The case of moral beliefs is particularly
well-suited to illustrate this possibility, since there is a respectable strand in the
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literature on moral realism that defends moral intuitionism; the idea that we
grasp moral truths through a cognitive faculty of moral intuition: (Moore (1903);
Ross (1930); Audi (2004); Huemer (2005)). These intuitionists hold that belief
in moral truths is not rational in virtue of being based on reasons, but in a non-
inferential way. Nonetheless, thinking carefully about the facts involved in
morally signiﬁcant situations is necessary to intuit the moral truth of the matter
correctly. Not because it provides us with reasons necessary to support our moral
beliefs, but because it occasions correct functioning of our intuition.
Something analogous may well apply to the case of religious beliefs. Thinking
carefully about the facts of religious pluralism could facilitate a renewed and
more powerful working of your sensus divinitatis and/or the IIHS – the same
cognitive processes by which your religious beliefs originally arose. To make this
more vivid: imagine that you ponder over your Christian beliefs and rehearse
some of the relevant facts about Christian theism, while also keeping in mind that
other thoughtful and intelligent people hold incompatible religious beliefs. Your
pondering occasions a powerful working of the Holy Spirit which reproduces your
Christian theistic belief with great force and internal compellingness. Although
you ﬁnd the epistemic situation very complex, you cannot help but feel strongly
convinced again that your religious beliefs are true, even though you admittedly
have nothing to oﬀer by way of independent evidence or arguments that will
move those who hold incompatible religious beliefs by even the slightest bit.
To drive home the point that this is indeed what Plantinga has in mind, the
following passage should suﬃce:5
A fresh or heightened awareness of the facts of religious pluralism could bring about a
reappraisal of one’s religious life, a reawakening, a new or renewed and deepened grasp
and apprehension of (1) and (2). From the perspective of the extended A/C model, it
could serve as an occasion for a renewed and more powerful working of the belief-
producing processes by which we come to apprehend (1) and (2). In this way knowledge of
the facts of pluralism could initially serve as a defeater; in the long run, however, it can
have precisely the opposite eﬀect. The facts of religious pluralism, therefore, … do
not or need not constitute a defeater for Christian belief. (Plantinga (2000), 457, my
italics)
If all of this is correct, then NR is false. An exclusivist who is aware of the facts
of pluralism does not necessarily need reasons to support her religious beliefs
after all.6
Even if what I have said so far is successful as an exercise in Plantinga-exegesis,
we should still ask whether the suggested procedure for defeater-defeat has any
plausibility. This is not the occasion for a full evaluation, but I can reply to four
concerns.
First, religious pluralism also provided the exclusivist with a defeater for any
belief to the eﬀect that the exclusivist possesses a special source of religious
knowledge, so how can it be legitimate to rely on this very source to defeat the
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defeater? The answer to this lies in the realization that RE promotes a strongly
externalist account of rationality, on which rationality is determined almost ex-
clusively by the de facto proper functioning of the subject’s cognitive faculties
and emphatically not by her having access to higher-order information about the
epistemic pedigree or status of her beliefs.7 Speciﬁcally, rationality does not
require a subject ﬁrst to have good reasons to believe a cognitive faculty to be
reliable (or any other higher-order beliefs) before she can rationally believe the
outputs of that faculty. Rather, it can go the other way around: when called for, a
subject can infer higher-order beliefs from ﬁrst-order beliefs that have been
formed by de facto properly functioning cognitive processes.8
This idea can then be extended to defeater-defeat. Applied to the problem at
hand, a new and powerful working of the sensus divinitatis or further IIHS – de
facto properly functioning faculties – will provide the additional support required
for the exclusivist’s (ﬁrst-order) religious beliefs to become rational again.
Finding herself with a strengthened conviction that her beliefs are true, the
exclusivist will, by implication, (1) take incompatible religious beliefs held by
adherents of other religions to be false, and (2) take others who claim to have
had incompatible religious experiences to be somehow epistemically less
fortunate and their testimony therefore of reduced value.9 In doing so, she defeats
both the direct defeater for her ﬁrst-order religious beliefs and the defeater for
the higher-order belief that she has access to a special source of religious
knowledge.
For those who remain sceptical, I should emphasize that this procedure for
defeater-defeat is nothing more than a straightforward reapplication of RE’s basic
externalist conception of rationality. Recall that, according to RE, a subject can
have rational beliefs while the fact that she has them, as well as other details of
her epistemic status are (almost) completely opaque to her. In particular, she
need not (1) have access to the grounds for her beliefs, (2) believe that her cog-
nitive faculties are functioning properly or be able to oﬀer arguments to that
eﬀect, and (3) believe – let alone be rational or warranted in believing or
know – that her beliefs are rational. To the extent that you are willing to accept
this as a basic conception of rationality, you should have no real problem also
accepting the procedure for defeater-defeat under consideration, because that
procedure merely reapplies the basic conception to defeater-defeat. Defeaters for
a belief can be defeated when that belief is reproduced (with greater strength) by
cognitive faculties which are assumed to be de facto functioning properly. Just as
before, the belief’s being produced by de facto properly functioning cognitive
faculties is what makes it rational again. By implication, defeaters for this belief
are defeated.
Secondly, what I have been saying entails that an exclusivist can rationally hold
religious beliefs in the basic way without having anything by way of a reason or
argument to defeat the defeater of religious pluralism. The exclusivist would
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simply have to ﬁnd herself with a ﬁrm conviction that her beliefs really are right,
in spite of counter-testimony from seemingly trustworthy sources. Perhaps
someone will want to object to this on the grounds that it ‘allows exclusive
religious beliefs to be eﬀectively immune from defeat, and reduces epistemology
to dogged psychological prejudices’ (Baldwin & Thune (2008), 451).10
In reply, I would urge that it is incorrect that on the current proposal defeater-
defeat requires nothing more than a ‘dogged prejudice’ to hold on to one’s
beliefs. Defeating the defeater of religious pluralism does require additional
support. The point is that this support need not necessarily come from reasons. It
can also come from the same non-inferential cognitive processes that originally
produced the beliefs. It is also incorrect that religious beliefs become ‘immune
from defeat’. An exclusivist may fail – temporarily or indeﬁnitely – to secure the
additional support required, in which case her belief remains defeated. Nothing
guarantees proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis or a renewed IIHS.
Thirdly, someone may propose that adherents of other religions can appeal to
an analogous procedure for defeater-defeat. They, too, might report that their
religious beliefs have been powerfully reproduced in them so that they now
strongly believe that they are right again. Wouldn’t this constitute yet another
defeater for the exclusivist’s religious beliefs? And isn’t it implausible to reply
that this defeater, too, could be defeated by yet another powerful working of the
sensus divinitatis and/or renewed IIHS? Doesn’t that lead to a possibly inﬁnite
succession of defeaters and defeater-defeaters?
Two things in reply. (1) The reformed epistemologist need not concede that
this scenario gives the exclusivist a new defeater. Once an exclusivist has defeated
the defeater of pluralism by means of the above procedure, further testimony by
adherents of other religions no longer constitutes a defeater relative to her overall
noetic structure.11 For that structure now includes a belief that adherents of other
religions are epistemically less fortunate than she is; this belief being inferred
from her reproduced properly basic ﬁrst-order religious beliefs. As a result,
their testimony can be dismissed. Or if the exclusivist’s noetic structure doesn’t
include such an explicit belief, it will at least include an awareness that others
may hold their religious beliefs with equal sincerity and conviction. Given this
awareness, however, further testimony adds nothing new to the exclusivist’s
epistemic situation and hence doesn’t give her a new defeater. (2) But even if the
reformed epistemologist were to admit that further testimony does give the ex-
clusivist a new defeater, I don’t see why there would be anything wrong – given
RE’s epistemological outlook – in holding that this new defeater could be
defeated by yet another working of the sensus divinitatis or IIHS. If the procedure
was defensible the ﬁrst time around, it is also defensible the second time in
an exactly analogous way. This indeed leads to an exclusivism that vacillates,
but it may be recalled that we now only see through a glass, darkly, in religious
matters.
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Fourthly, although I am convinced that Plantinga’s suggestion is fundamen-
tally sound, I admit that the situation Plantinga envisages for a pluralism-aware
exclusivist is indeed epistemically unattractive. Consider how her situation looks
from her own perspective. She is ﬁrmly convinced of the truth of her religious
beliefs. However, she need not know (nor even believe) that she is rational in
believing as she does. When pressed, she might have to admit that nothing she
can say will convince adherents of other religions of the truth of her own beliefs.
Although she takes adherents of other religions to be epistemically less well-oﬀ,
she can oﬀer nothing to substantiate this, besides her own conviction that she is
right. Obviously, such a situation is unattractive, at least in so far as rationality has
anything to do with discussing and justifying one’s own ideas in a dialectical
situation.12 It exempliﬁes a kind of epistemic isolation that it would be preferable
not to be in.
However, it does not follow that the exclusivist is irrational in sticking to her
beliefs. There are lots of states one can be in that are epistemically unattractive,
but that do not make one any less rational. For instance, believing falsehoods on
the basis of misleading evidence or not believing important truths because one
has not been properly exposed to them. A defender of RE can readily admit that
the exclusivist’s situation is unfortunate, but insist that it is sometimes the best
one can do. Surely it would be epistemically preferable if we could always justify
our true beliefs with publicly available and objective evidence that convinces
those who demur, but such is not our privilege. This does not prove that rational
religious exclusivism is impossible.
Must reasons be retained?
Suppose the argument of the previous section fails and that NR is
correct after all. Have Baldwin and Thune then succeeded in showing that
rational religious belief cannot be basic for an exclusivist who is aware of
pluralism? No, I will argue. RR, too, is false because defeater-defeaters for re-
ligious pluralism may well be of the Drain-O variety. The reason is that ex-
cluding this possibility requires an independence constraint on admissible
defeater-defeaters that leads to fairly widespread scepticism and is therefore
unattractive.
Although Baldwin and Thune assert that defeater-defeaters for religious
pluralism will always be table legs, they do not provide an argument to back up
their claim. Let us ﬁrst consider what a Drain-O defeater might look like for the
case at hand. Suppose an exclusivist comes to believe – through reading a book
on apologetics, say – that adherents of other religions are deceived by Satan
into believing they have veridical religious experiences of a deity. God allows this
because He is intent on testing the faith of His elect by exposing them to mis-
leading testimony. This story would constitute a Drain-O defeater-defeater, for it
8 J EROEN DE R IDDER
provides the exclusivist with a reason not to take the testimony of adherents of
other religions seriously while it adds nothing new to support the exclusivist’s
own religious beliefs. It is like learning that your friend John was joking when he
testiﬁed to the whiteness of the table inmy earlier example. Having acquired such
a defeater-defeater, you can forget about the whole aﬀair and your belief goes
back to its original proper basicality.
Apparently, then, Baldwin and Thune think all defeater-defeaters of this kind
are ruled out. The most plausible explanation for this is that they implicitly take
for granted some kind of independence constraint on admissible defeater-
defeaters, which attempts to rule out defeater-defeaters that somehow depend
for their rationality on the rationality of the original (threatened) belief.13 Without
some such constraint, there is no reason to think that Drain-O defeaters are im-
possible and hence no reason to believe RR. Perhaps Baldwin and Thune believe
something like David Silver’s version of such a constraint is correct: ‘Z cannot
neutralize X as a potential defeater for Y if Z is evidentially dependent on Y’
(Silver (2001), 9), where ‘belief Z is evidentially dependent on belief Y for agent S
just in case it is rational for S to believe that the warrant for Z is derivative of the
warrant for Y. Otherwise Z is evidentially independent of Y for agent S’ (ibid., 8).
Presumably, this constraint would rule out the above story as a defeater-defeater,
because the rationality of believing that story is derivative of the rationality of the
exclusivist’s original religious beliefs (although perhaps only indirectly so through
being derivative of the rationality of the apologetics book’s author’s religious
beliefs).14
I want to suggest that Baldwin and Thune would do well not to embrace any
such unqualiﬁed independence constraints, as they engender fairly widespread
scepticism, not only for religious matters, but also for many philosophical,
political, and moral matters. Such scepticism, moreover, undermines their own
conclusion.
To see why this is so, notice that the independence constraint above in eﬀect
demands that one has a non-question-begging argument or other source of
epistemic support to back up one’s belief. While this is usually feasible for beliefs
about mundane matters such as the colour of tables and your friend’s party
attendance, it is far from obvious that this standard can be met for religious,
ethical, political, and philosophical beliefs (van Inwagen (1996, 2010); Elga (2010);
Kelly (2010)). In philosophical controversy, for instance, both parties can often
marshal impressive arguments for their beliefs, as well as weighty objections to
the other party’s beliefs, clever responses to defuse these objections, and so on.
Although there is no room to argue the point here, I am convinced that ultimately
one’s evaluation of the success of the arguments, objections, and responses
comes down to basic philosophical intuitions, which cannot themselves be
defended by further non-question-begging arguments. Any attempt to defeat
defeaters for one’s philosophical beliefs, then, must sooner or later presuppose
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the truth of such basic intuitions. However, one’s philosophical beliefs also
depend on the same intuitions for their ultimate support. So we have a scenario
in which, ultimately, basic intuitions are supposed to defeat defeaters for beliefs,
the rationality of which is derivative of the rationality of those very same intui-
tions. This violates the independence constraint. As a result, many philosophical
beliefs will be beset by undefeated defeaters and must therefore be given up.
The same holds for controversial – which is to say many – moral, political, and
religious beliefs.15
The point can also be brought out by considering Baldwin and Thune’s
discussion of Vogelstein’s case of a moral realist who receives testimony from
a sociopath to the eﬀect that there are no moral truths (Vogelstein (2004), 189).16
Baldwin and Thune say that the moral realist can easily defeat the defeater
presented by the sociopath’s testimony. The relevant defeater-defeater ‘involves
the conjunction of (1) the fact that there are good arguments for moral realism
and (2) the fact that one person’s testimony against moral realism is, given (1), of
little epistemic value’ (Baldwin and Thune (2008), 449). The arguments they have
in mind are those available in the philosophical literature.
Now suppose that we exchange the sociopath for a competent philosopher,
who is a passionate defender of moral anti-realism.17 This philosopher is able
to oﬀer objections to any epistemically signiﬁcant reason for moral realism the
realist can muster. If what I said above about philosophical arguments – to wit,
that their evaluation is ultimately a matter of basic philosophical intuitions – is
roughly correct, then the moral realist will violate an independence constraint if
she sticks to her belief. She must appeal to reasons that depend crucially on her
basic realist intuitions for their ultimate support. Hence, the rational thing to
do – for both the realist and the anti-realist – would be to give up their respective
beliefs and become agnostic.
Given that this case is structurally similar to many controversies in religion,
ethics, politics, and philosophy, anyone who embraces an independence con-
straint of the kind we have been considering in eﬀect embraces widespread
scepticism in these areas. For Baldwin and Thune speciﬁcally, this entails that
they ought to give up their conclusion that an exclusivist who is aware of plural-
ism cannot hold religious beliefs in a properly basic way, since that conclusion
itself is confronted with counter-arguments from other philosophers and the only
way to defend it may well be by arguments that ultimately beg the question
against the epistemological externalism RE promotes – that is what I take my four
remarks at the end of the previous section to hint at.
In sum, then, independence constraints of the sort we have been looking at are
unattractive and therefore we have no reason to believe that RR is correct. If RR is
false, however, it remains possible for an exclusivist to obtain a Drain-O defeater-
defeater, in which case her religious beliefs could go back to being rational in the
manner of properly basic beliefs.
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A better argument against exclusivism?
Baldwin and Thune’s argument fails. But perhaps there is a better argu-
ment for the conclusion that exclusivism cannot be rational in the manner of
properly basic beliefs lurking nearby.
Like most epistemologies, RE is fallibilist ; at least in the sense that it allows for
rationally held but false beliefs. The facts of religious pluralism show that people
who, for all appearances, are equally intellectually, morally, and spiritually
virtuous hold religious beliefs that are incompatible with the exclusivist’s beliefs,
and perhaps also that they do so partly because they claim to have access to a
special source of religious knowledge that others lack. This makes salient the
possibility that the exclusivist’s own religious beliefs are false and her special
source unreliable. Upon appreciating this possibility, the exclusivist should ac-
quire a higher-order belief that her religious beliefs may well be wrong and that
she may well lack access to a special source of religious knowledge. This belief
isn’t a defeater of the kind we considered above as it isn’t incompatible with
anything that the exclusivist believes. Nonetheless, it seems that this higher-order
belief ought to have a downward eﬀect on the exclusivist’s ﬁrst-order religious
beliefs and lead her to reduce her conﬁdence or even suspend judgement on
contested religious matters.18 Not doing so surely exhibits some kind of epistemic
defect or negligence.
This line of thinking receives further support from a comparison with other
sources of basic beliefs. Suppose you and a friend both look out a window and see
a car. Your friend says it’s a model A whereas you see it to be a model B. From
what the both of you can tell, your beliefs are formed in normally favourable
circumstances, there are no obstacles in your respective lines of sight, you both
have equally good eyesight, are equally knowledgeable about cars, aren’t con-
fused in any relevant way, etc. Taking another look doesn’t resolve your dis-
agreement. Wouldn’t the rational thing to do be to suspend judgement? Or take
memory beliefs. Your friend and you both try to remember what colour shirt Bob
was wearing yesterday. Again, for all you can tell, you are both equally well-poised
to remember correctly, there are no confusions, etc. Yet your friend says Bob’s
shirt was green and you remember it was blue. Careful reconsideration and ex-
change of information doesn’t resolve your disagreement. Shouldn’t both of you
give up your beliefs and suspend judgement?
This seems to me to be the strongest case from religious pluralism against
exclusivism that doesn’t beg any questions against RE’s externalism. But I don’t
think that it is conclusive. I will consider three things that can be said on behalf of
RE. First of all, the reformed epistemologist can readily admit that awareness of
religious pluralism calls for reduced conﬁdence. An exclusivist who is properly
sensitive to the deeply ambiguous epistemic situation in which she and others
form religious beliefs, will hold her beliefs with epistemic humility. However, it
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doesn’t follow that suspension of judgement is rationally required. Pluralism
might decrease one’s conﬁdence, but not necessarily below the threshold for
rational (or warranted) belief.
This might seem a little feeble in the absence of an explanation for how the
warrant for the exclusivist’s religious beliefs manages to stay above the threshold.
That brings me to a second point. The defender of RE can once more insist on a
thoroughly externalist understanding of rationality. If, even while being fully and
vividly aware of every relevant fact of religious pluralism, it strongly seems to the
exclusivist that her religious beliefs are correct, then if this strong seeming is in
fact brought about by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis and/or a renewed
IIHS, her ﬁrst-order religious beliefs will be rational, no matter what additional
higher-order beliefs about the possibility of being wrong she may simultaneously
entertain. She can even infer counterbalancing higher-order beliefs (e.g. that even
though she may be wrong, it strongly seems to her that she is in fact right) from
her renewed ﬁrst-order beliefs.19
To put this in perspective, it is important to see that what is being claimed here
is not that everyone, regardless of their favoured notion of rationality, must admit
that the above scenario restores the rationality of exclusivism. The point is that
exclusivism is rendered rational in the speciﬁc externalist sense endorsed by RE.
Furthermore, the reformed epistemologist can grant that exclusivist adherents of
other religions (who, we can safely assume, may feel just as strongly about the
seeming truth of their religious beliefs) may also be rational in the qualiﬁed sense
of internal rationality, although – assuming Christian theism to be true – they fall
short of full rationality because they are not externally rational (see n. 4 for this
distinction). Given the input to their cognitive faculties, there is nothing wrong
with their belief-formation, but – again assuming Christian theism – their input
itself (‘upstream from experience’) is not what it ought to be.
It may also help to consider what the alternatives are. Suppose it is accepted
that withholding judgement is the rational response, at least until one gathers
further support for the truth of one’s beliefs from other sources. As we saw in the
previous section, this easily leads down a path to widespread scepticism, not only
in religious matters, but also in philosophy, politics, and ethics. While some may
ﬁnd this acceptable or even appropriate, I take such an outcome to show that
one’s construal of rationality has gone astray.
Thirdly and ﬁnally, in view of the analogy with perceptual and memory beliefs,
the defender of RE could develop her notion of rationality to allow for a diﬀer-
ential treatment of diﬀerent kinds of beliefs.20 There are at least two features of
the perception andmemory cases above that account for the intuitive rightness of
suspension of belief. First, in real-life versions of such cases, there is usually an
easy method available to settle the disagreement. You walk closer to the car or
look the model up on the internet. You ask Bob about his shirt. It is therefore
inappropriate just to hold on to your beliefs and not employ such a method of
12 J EROEN DE R IDDER
veriﬁcation. Secondly, persistent disagreement hardly ever occurs in real-life
cases of this kind. So if it does, something exceptional or weird must be going on.
In consequence, all bets are oﬀ and you should withhold judgement.
These two features are perspicuously absent in the case of religious belief
(and also in many typical cases of philosophical, moral, and political beliefs).
There are no (independent) methods of veriﬁcation available and persistent dis-
agreement is ubiquitous. Because of that, it not at all clear that it is rationally
inappropriate to stick to these kinds of beliefs if they strongly seem true to you,
even while you are fully aware of persistent disagreements and the impossibility
of their resolution. The defender of RE can therefore reply that the above analogy
is beside the point, because rationality gives diﬀerent prescriptions for perceptual
and memorial beliefs than it does for religious beliefs.
Conclusion
Baldwin and Thune’s attack on RE’s defence of exclusivism fails. The re-
formed epistemologist need not accept NR, while RR can only be made plausible
with the help of an independence constraint that leads to unattractive fairly
widespread scepticism. An argument similar to Baldwin and Thune’s which
doesn’t rely on NR or RR also fails to establish the desired conclusion. As far
as I can see, this exhausts the resources for arguing from pluralism against
RE’s defence of exclusivism. I therefore conclude that RE’s defence of the possi-
bility of rationally holding religious beliefs in the basic way, even for an exclusivist
who is aware of the facts of religious pluralism, remains as plausible as it ever
was.21
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Notes
1. I choose not to follow Baldwin & Thune (2008) in speaking about ‘exclusive beliefs’. That expression
strikes me as inaccurate since any belief is exclusive in the sense that, if one holds it, one holds
incompatible beliefs to be untrue. Hence, exclusivism is not so much a property of beliefs as it is a
position or attitude of a person holding certain beliefs, to wit that of continuing to hold that one is right
and others wrong while not having a knock-down argument for one’s own beliefs ; cf. Plantinga (2000),
440 (a deﬁnition of exclusivism along these lines).
2. Their paper builds on earlier work by David Silver (2001) and replies to Eric Vogelstein’s (2004) criticisms
of Silver.
3. This ‘principle of testimony’ is accepted by everyone in the debate; cf. Plantinga (1993), 77–82, Silver
(2001), 5, and Baldwin & Thune (2008), 446.
4. Here and throughout, ‘rationality ’ should be understood in RE’s characteristic sense of having properly
functioning cognitive faculties. Full rationality in this sense requires both what Plantinga (2000), 110–113,
calls internal and external rationality. Internal rationality consists in proper function ‘downstream from
experience’ : forming the right beliefs in response to one’s cognitive input of sensuous imagery and
doxastic experience, having coherent beliefs, drawing the right inferences, making the right decisions
given one’s beliefs, and fulﬁlling one’s epistemic duties. External rationality consists in proper function
‘upstream from experience’ : forming the right kind of cognitive input, i.e. sensuous imagery and
doxastic experience.
5. The passage is directly below the one quoted by Baldwin and Thune. In it, (1) and (2) stand for the
following two religious claims: ‘(1) The world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing and
perfectly good personal being (the sort of being who holds beliefs, has aims and intentions, and can act
to accomplish these aims); and (2) Human beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way
of salvation through the incarnation, life, sacriﬁcial death, and resurrection of his divine son’; Plantinga
(2000), 438.
6. Note that my interpretation of Plantinga diﬀers from the Principle of Testimonial Evidence (PTE) that
Vogelstein endorses to defend Plantinga: ‘If I believe a proposition P in the basic way, then if I hear
testimony thatyP and have no further defeater for P oryP, I ought to weigh the strength of my
inclination to believe that P against the strength of my inclination to believe thatyP (based on that
testimony) in order to determine whether to believe P,yP, or neither P noryP’ ; Vogelstein (2004), 190.
Pace Vogelstein, I concede to Baldwin and Thune that simply weighing the strengths of your inclinations
to believe is not enough. In the face of pluralism, one really needs additional support for one’s religious
beliefs. However, pace Baldwin and Thune, I am urging that this support may come from the same
quasi-perceptual and testimonial sources that originally produced the beliefs and need not stem from
(independent) reasons.
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7. Pryor (2001) provides a helpful overview of the many diﬀerent versions of externalism. Here I take
externalism as the denial of the theses that rationality requires that one have special access to: (1) the
grounds for one’s beliefs, and (2) the epistemic status of one’s beliefs (e.g. their rationality or the
adequacy of the grounds on which they are based). This is RE’s brand of externalism.
8. Vogel (2000, 2008) objects to exactly this feature of externalist epistemologies, arguing that it allows for
illegitimate bootstrapping. Cohen (2002, 2005), Van Cleve (2003), and Weisberg (forthcoming), however,
argue that the problem generalizes to internalist epistemologies and is independent of the internalism/
externalism controversy.
9. As Plantinga (2000), 453 says about the exclusivist in such a situation: ‘She must think that there is an
important epistemic diﬀerence: she thinks that somehow the other person has made a mistake, or has a
blind spot, or hasn’t been wholly attentive, or hasn’t received some grace she has, or is blinded by
ambition or pride or mother love or something else; she must think that she has access to a source of
warranted belief the other lacks. ’
10. Although the quotation is part of an objection levelled against Vogelstein’s PTE, the worry it expresses
can also be raised for what I have been saying.
11. See Plantinga (2000), 360–363 for the point that defeaters are always relative to a person’s total noetic
structure.
12. Alston (1988), 273 suggests that the notion of justiﬁcation derives from the idea of dialectically justifying
one’s beliefs.
13. One could read their endorsement of what Vogelstein calls the Principle of Testimonial Defeat (PTD) in
this vein; Baldwin & Thune (2008), 447–451. This principle, which Vogelstein ends up rejecting, reads as
follows: ‘If I believe proposition P in the basic way, then if I hear testimony thatyP, I ought to believe
neither P noryP (or equivalently, P andyP act as defeaters for each other) unless I have a defeater for
yP other than P (in which case I ought to believe P), or a defeater for P other thanyP (in which case I
ought to believeyP)’ ; Vogelstein (2004), 189.
14. Such indirect dependence introduces complications for the formulation of any plausible independency
constraint that neither Silver nor Baldwin and Thune address, but that is not my concern here.
15. Here I disagree with Silver (2001), 12–15, who thinks the ensuing scepticism can mostly be warded oﬀ or,
where it cannot, is warranted.
16. It is unfortunate that Vogelstein sets up his case around a sociopath, for someone’s being a sociopath is
already suﬃcient reason not to take seriously his or her testimony on moral and social matters. (We
don’t take the testimony of the colour-blind on colours seriously either.) Baldwin and Thune rightly
exploit this weakness in their reply.
17. If someone wants to object that the testimony of one anti-realist is not enough to be taken seriously, you
can bring in however many anti-realists is deemed suﬃcient.
18. Kelly (2010), 158ﬀ. calls this ‘downward epistemic push’.
19. Kelly (2010), 159 labels this ‘upward epistemic push’. Cf. also n. 8 above for worries about bootstrapping.
20. I’m not aware of any attempts to try this for Plantinga’s form of RE, but Alston’s (1991) doxastic practice
approach is sensitive to the fact that rationality may amount to slightly diﬀerent things for diﬀerent
kinds of belief-forming practices.
21. I am grateful to Martijn Blaauw, Ian Church, Rik Peels, Herman Philipse, and Rene´ van Woudenberg for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. An anonymous referee for the journal deserves
special thanks for inviting me to develop my argument in a further direction.
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